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Take a Letter, Your Honor: Outing the
Judicial Epistemology of Hart v. Massanari
Penelope Pether*
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
...everywhere

The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.'
Trading... not just [on] the contemptuous demonstration that powerful
people don't have to be acute or right, but even more, the contemptuous
demonstration... of how obtuseness itself arms the powerful against their
enemies ....
Beyond the communication of the sentence, what took place at this
interview was never known.3
*
Penelope Pether, Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; formerly
Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. Thanks are due to Dean
Mark Sargent, Villanova University School of Law and the Frances Lewis Law Center at
Washington and Lee University School of Law for the research funding that supported the
writing of this article; to Dean Claudio Grossman, American University Washington College of
Law for research support for preparing an earlier version of this article for presentation at the
Have We Ceased To Be a Common Law Country?: A Conversation on Unpublished,
Depublished, Withdrawn and Per Curiam Opinions Symposium held at the Washington and
Lee University School of Law on March 18, 2005; to Bryce Coughlin, American University
Washington College of Law J.D. 2006, and Sarah Stevenson, Villanova University School of
Law J.D. 2007 for imaginative and tenacious research assistance; to my colleague Steve
Chanenson for suggesting some obscure and useful sources; and to Associate Professor Joseph
Pugliese, Department of Critical and Cultural Studies, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia,
for suggesting the utility of Sedgwick's Epistemology of the Closet for my reading of Hartv.
Massanari.
1. 1 William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF W.B.
YEATS 189 (Richard J. Finneman ed., 1989).
2. See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 7 (1990) (describing
the majority's statements in Bowers v. Hardwickthat "the right to engage in sodomy is 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' ...
[as], at best, facetious." (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986))).
3. HERMAN MELVlLLE, Billy Budd, Sailor,in PIERRE; IsRAEL POTTER; THEPAZZATALES;
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I.Introduction

These epigraphs have a dramatic tone. They are also unabashedly literary.
Those who take the position that the concern expressed by some judges, 4 most
practicing litigators, 5 and many scholars 6 about unpublication and the other
practices of private judging that are proliferating in the United States courts is
"[m]uch ado about little"7 might find them melodramatic on the one hand,
trivial texts-because they are, like unpublished opinions, "not law"-on the
other.8
But then, as scholars of literature know, comedy can be a serious business.
As Tim Nelson writes, "[m]ost good comedies contain potentially tragic
scenes.... [I]n Much Ado About Nothing, a guiltless woman is repudiated and
disgraced at the altar," 9 a trope the bleak potential of which is plumbed in
Shakespeare's problem play Measurefor Measure.'0 It is a trope that teaches
THE CONFIDENCE-MAN; UNCOLLECTED PROSE; BILLY BUDD 1351, 1418 (Harrison Hayford &

Merton M. Sealts, Jr. eds., Library of Am. 1984) (1962).
4. See, e.g., Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J.App.PRAc. &
PROCESS 219, 219 (1999) (expressing discomfort about producing unpublished opinions);
Penelope Pether, InequitableInjunctions: The Scandal of PrivateJudging in the US. Courts,
56 STAN. L. REv. 1435, 1450, 1487 (2004) [hereinafter Pether, InequitableInjunctions](citing
several judges expressing concern about unpublished opinions); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric
ofResults andthe Results of Rhetoric: JudicialWritings, 62 U. CI-m. L. REv. 1371, 1374 (1995)
[hereinafter Wald, Rhetoric] (criticizing results of unpublished opinions); Patricia M. Wald, The
Problem with the Courts: Black-RobedBureaucracyor Collegiality Under Challenge?,42 MD.
L. REv. 766, 786 (1983) [hereinafter Wald, Problem] (asserting that publication is an essential
judicial function).
5. See, e.g., William T. Hangley, OpinionsHidden, CitationsForbidden:A Report and
Recommendations ofthe American College of TrialLawyers on the PublicationandCitationof
Nonbinding Federal Circuit Court Opinions, 208 F.R.D. 645, 664 (2002) (advocating for
publication of nonbinding opinions); TIM REAGAN Er AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CITATIONS
TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 15 (2005), available at

http://www. c.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/citatio2.pdf$file/citatio2.pdf (presenting statistics that
support assertion that trial lawyers favor publication); Lauren Robel, The PracticeofPrecedent:
Anastasoff, NoncitationRules, and the Meaning ofPrecedent in an InterpretiveCommunity, 35
IND. L. REv. 399, 407 tbl.2 (2002) (presenting statistics which show the percentage of lawyers
who believe citation restrictions are a problem).
6. See, e.g., Robel, supra note 5, at 417 (advocating a ban on unpublished opinions).
7. Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explainingthe Sturm Und Drang over the
Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429 (2005).
8. Even a circuit as (recently) permissive about the citation of unpublished opinions as
the D.C. Circuit holds that "a panel's decision to issue an unpublished disposition means that
the panel sees no precedential value in that disposition." D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2).
9. T.G.A. NELSON, COMEDY: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMEDY IN LITERATURE, DRAMA,
AND CINEMA 30 (1990).
10. Penelope Pether, MeasuredJudgments?: Histories,Pedagogies,and the Possibility
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us that the banality so characteristic of soap opera-that iteration of melodrama
that is a staple of what one might call the entertainment arm of the militaryindustrial complex-can also be the stuff of the tragic, of great and often
painful significance in the everyday life of ordinary people. Which is to say
that things may not be as trivial as they may be made to seem.
In Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of PrivateJudging in the U.S.
Courts," I argued that the private history of contemporary institutionalized
unpublication of judicial opinions began as a judicial backlash against the
desegregation mandate of Brown v. Boardof Education.12 I then mapped the
frequently overlapping practices of unpublication, depublication, and stipulated
withdrawal ofjudicial opinions, 13 which have structurally subordinating effects
on a range of marginalized groups 14 and exact a toll on the rule of law.'165
Finally, I argued that the institutionalization of these practices since the 1960s
had a corrupting effect on the national judicial habitus. 7
This Article responds to some recent developments in various federal
judicial institutions 18 regarding the modest proposal for reform of
institutionalized unpublication.19 It focuses on both a key institutional actor
and a seminal legal text which stand in opposition to that reform initiative:
Judge Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and
2 ° If the debate about unpublication is a
his opinion in Hart v. Massanari.
contest about two things that I take very seriously indeed, epistemology and the
of Equity, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 489, 490 (2002).
11. Pether, Inequitable Injunctions,supra note 4.
12. Id. at 1441-42 n.20, 1445 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)).
13. Id. at 1442-83.
14. Id. at 1504-14.
15. Id. at 1483-1504.
16. Id. at 1444-65.
17. That habitus has been described as the "embodied experience" which makes members
of particular cultures or professions "who they are." PIERE BOuRDIEu, THE LOGIC OFPRACnCE
53 (1990). Bourdieu has written on legal professional subject formation. See generally Pierre
Bourdieu, The ForceofLaw: Towarda Sociology ofthe JuridicalField, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805
(1987).
18. See infra note 210 and accompanying text (recounting the Judicial Conference of the
United States' consideration of proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 through its
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and its Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules).
19. Proposed Rule 32.1 would prevent federal courts from banning citation of any oftheir
unpublished opinions. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF APPELLATE, BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 31 (2003).

20. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
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constitutive law of the land that is the most powerful in the contemporary
world, then this Article's task is to suggest that the stakes symbolized by the
proposed amendment,2 1 an amendment until recently apparently doomed to
fail,22 are extraordinarily high. In short, it suggests why we should all take very
seriously what we can learn from this paradoxically fierce skirmish over a small
piece of procedural delegated legislation. Until a recent reversal in its fortunes,
that legislation apparently was doomed despite evidence suggesting that most
lawyers are in favor of it and judicial objections to it are unpersuasive,23
because it was said to be too controversial. 24 That controversy had been
escalated, if not generated, 25 by a powerful judge26 with a track record of
"hostility to dissent 2 7 by means that include his alleged egregious practice of
enrolling lawyers who appear before his circuit in the political agitation over
FRAP 32.1 .28 The legislation was threatened because of what it symbolizesthat we have ceased to be a common law country.
Part II of this Article undertakes a detailed critical discourse analysis of
the construction of a revisionist history of the United States doctrine of
precedent in Hart. Critical discourse analysis is a method of reading texts
against other texts29 starting from the premise that discourses--cultural stories
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing proposed amendment which
would mandate the end of citation bans in the federal appellate courts).
22. See Pether, InequitableInjunctions,supra note 4, at 1471 (expressing grave doubt as
to the amendment's chance of passage). The amendment has recently cleared apparently the
most significant hurdle to its passage, approval by the United States Judicial Conference. News
Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Conference Memorializes Late Chief Justice
Acts on Administrative, Legislative Matters (Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/PressReleases/judconf092005.html. But see infra note 210 (noting that the
conference restricted the operation of the proposed rule to opinions issued "on or after January
1, 2007").
23. See REAGAN ET AL., supranote 5, at 3-19 (collecting evidence regarding support for
unpublication reform).
24. See Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 4, at 1471 (listing opponents of
unpublication rules).
25. See id. at 1470 n. 170 (noting a writing campaign instigated by Judge Kozinski to
preserve a public hearing on proposed FRAP 32.1).
26. See id.(referring to Judge Kozinski).
27. Thomas M. Devine & Donald G. Aplin, Abuse ofAuthority: The Office of the Special
Counsel and Whistleblower Protection,4 A~nOCH L.J. 5, 27 (1986).
28. A former colleague was issued an invitation to speak to the Ninth Circuit on this
topic; he was subsequently asked to speak on a different topic. E-mail from Steve Wermeil,
Associate Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law, to Penelope
Pether, Professor of Law, Villanova University (June 14, 2005, 12:11 EST) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. This method draws on the work of Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, and Michel
Foucault.

TAKE A LETTER, YOUR HONOR

1557

which we produce and through which we make sense of and thus produce
"reality"-in turn shape us as professionals, the institutions in which we work,
and the discourses we in turn mobilize in our work through the processes of
"subject formation." Further, it posits that those discourses "circulate without
authorship and without discursive and disciplinary controls. 30
Critical
discourse analysis goes on to collapse the opposition between text and its
consumer/creator, a relationship akin to the opposition between mind and body.
It posits that "the only way that intertextual links between texts can be made 3is1
through the specifics of habituated, trained, coloured and gendered bodies."
The analysis thus concludes that "[f]eminist discourse analysis pays particular
attention to the embodied experience of those who pass judgment and make the
law."3 2 Critical discourse analysis, then, argues for reading texts intertextually,
seeking to make visible the ways in which institutions and their discourses and
"practices of subject formation" shape us. It searches for a discourse's
"external conditions of existence, its appearance and its regularity" 33 that make
it possible for people with particular kinds of histories to know certain things
and not others, to think certain things and not others.
This Article begins by analyzing the discourse of rectitude and fidelity to
the common law in Anastasoffv. UnitedStates,34 Hart'scompanion-piece and
immediate progenitor, and the fluctuating discourses of Hart. In Anastasoff,
the late Judge Richard Arnold held that the Eighth Circuit's ban on citing
unpublished opinions was unconstitutional because it was ultra vires of Article
I11 judicial power.35 One of Hart'sdiscourses depends on a vision of Article I
judicial power both plenary and supplemented by administrative authority such
that Article III power is not implicated by unpublication. The other is a
discourse of constraint that is ironically, and never admitted to be, selfimposed. Hartclaims a two-tiered system ofjudicial decisionmaking, which
enables judges to prospectively declare some opinions precedential and others
not, is not unconstitutional. (This is one aspect of modem institutionalized
unpublication-citation bans are another.) Rather, it is business as usual,
dignified by a distinctively Anglo-American legal tradition.

30. Penelope Pether, CriticalDiscourseAnalysis, Rape Law and the Jury Instruction
Simplification Project, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 53, 59 (1999) [hereinafter Pether, CriticalDiscourse
Analysis].
31. Id. at60.
32. Id

33.

Id.

34.
35.

Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 905.
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Next, this Article goes on to read Hart against other texts including
Anastasoffand the precedent Hart adduces. Intertextual reading will suggest
how the law we read, write, and practice is all the law we have. It will further
suggest in what image the texts, the institutions, and the discourses of the law
in turn shape the judges who make it.
Recent events in what were my home jurisdictions as I wrote this article,
the Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit, and more generally in Great Britain, the
seat of the common law, have involved the power of governments and the
importance of an independentjudiciary. In conjunction with the contributions
of my colleagues in this Symposium, they have prompted the use of my
methodological strategy in this Article. This strategy is designed to trouble the
emergent and insistent dominant discourses about unpublication and the
curious U.S. variant of"the common law." In the manner of another common
law country, it "respectfully dissents."
This dissenting opinion is given its specific occasion both by the
Symposium of which this Article forms part, and by the history of the recent
proposal to amend the Federal Rules ofAppellate Procedure. That amendment,
if it becomes law, would undo arguably the least problematic aspect of modem
institutionalized unpublication: the citation bans that in many jurisdictions
(1) expose attorneys who cite unpublished opinions back to the courts that
issued them to sanctions, and (2) spare judges the embarrassment of having to
confront the propriety and fairness of treating similarly-situated litigants
differently.
Judicial ethics questions of these.kinds have particularly high stakes in
parts of the common law world in light of the aftermath of events including the
9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Bali bombings,
and those on the transportation systems of London and Madrid. Those events
have provoked imperatives to curtail the civil liberties of some among us,
"terrorists" and "enemy combatants." As a practical matter, judges are all that
stand between individuals at risk of having their civil liberties curtailed and the
power of the state. Difficult as it may be to some reading this Article to
concede, current abridgements of civil liberties run the potential risk of
undermining the efficacy of what we call the Rule of Law in regulating civil
society.
Thus, if Judge Kozinski is correct that the United States' system of
precedent has diverged from the common law,36 there are signs that as a result
we are also at risk of the dominant ethos of the U.S. federal judiciary ceasing to
36. This divergence itself is in many ways a result of the power he asserts to legitimize
modem institutionalized unpublication.
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be that of common law judges. Rather, we have the emergence of a theory and
practice ofjudicial lawmaking that is explicitly legislative and brooks no effective
constraints other than judicial fiat. Accordingly, the symbolic stakes of the fate of
the proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, for all the modesty of the
proposed reform itself, are extraordinarily high.
Part 1I of this Article articulates the basis for the dissenting opinion about
what has become "business as usual," not only in the federal courts of appeals, the
subject of my analysis here, but also in federal district courts and state courts. It
argues that Hart displays constitutive and symptomatic "hostility to dissent" 37 and
a corrosive influence on the habitus-the "embodied experience" constitutive of
the professional identity 3 ---of the United States federal judiciary. This Article
draws on Sedgwick's insight that a "complex drama of ignorance and knowledge
is the.., usual carrier of political struggle, 3 9 and on the evidence of the
imbrication and constitutive significance of race relations 4° in the development
and maintenance of the system of institutionalized unpublication of judicial
opinions. It suggests that the powerful "ignorance effects" institutionalized by the
modem unpublication regime in the U.S. courts of appeals have a significance
beyond the immediate realm of what opinions may be cited, to whom, and when.
Their significance extends through the habituated interpretive practices of the
members of the federal bench to the fabric of the law itself.
Sedgwick describes a paradigm she identifies as the "epistemology of the
closet"-the harnessing of the studied "obtuseness" of"the powerful" 4l-which
operates to "structure meaning "' 4 2 in this culture. Using this insight, Part III
argues that the modem systematization of unpublication has created since the
1960s a troubling and characteristic divergence of the U.S. federal courts from the
"common law." The crux of the divergence is that modem systematized
unpublication has produced a congeries of "ignorance effects... , harnessed,
licensed, and regulated on a mass scale for striking enforcements, 43 of what the
rhetorician of law Peter Goodrich has described as legal texts' techniques of legal
37.

This quality has been ascribed to Judge Kozinski. Devine & Aplin, supranote 27, at

27.
38. BOURDIEu, THE LoGic OF PRACnCE, supranote 17, at 53.
39. SEDOWICK, supranote 2, at 6.
40. See Pether, Inequitable injunctions, supra note 4, at 1441-42 & n.20 (suggesting
courts used unpublished opinions to discriminate against minorities).
41. See SEDGWICK, supranote 2, at 7 (arguing that "obtuseness itself arms the powerful
against their enemies").
42. See id.
at 11 (hypothesizing that "certain binarisms that structure meaning in a culture
may be 'ineffaceably marked' by association with the modem crisis of homo/heterosexual
definition").
43. Id. at5.
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monologue and dialogue, by which the texts of the law seek to pretend to a
neutral rationality and to suppress alternative discourses. 44 These alternative
discourses might be likened to the voices of dissent.
Part III reads the justificatory discourse of Hart v. Massanare5 against
another set of texts, also emanating from the federal appellate bench, about
modem institutional unpublication. This justificatory discourse constitutes the
practices of the federal appellate courts and their procedures for the making of
law through its interpretation and application, as does the different cultural
story that emerges from the second set ofjudicial texts. In turn, this discourse
shapes the professional identities of the members of the federal appellate bench,
who, in turn, make law that is both substantive and adjectival.
I. The Discourses ofAnastasoff andHart
Faye Anastasoff filed a claim for a tax refund that was-just-timely: It
was mailed one day before the relevant statutory cutoff.46 When it arrived at
the Internal Revenue Service, it was-just-late because the IRS could only
repay overpaid taxes if the taxes had been paid within three years to the day
before receipt and filing at the IRS of the refund claim.47 Her claim got there
one day late.48 Ms. Anastasoff's claim that the "Mailbox Rule" should save her
claim failed in the federal district court and again on appeal.49 In what must
have seemed to Ms. Anastasoff to be the paradigm of"Catch 22," the court held
that although the Mailbox Rule rescues claims that are received late although
postmarked in time, it does not rescue claims that are postmarked within the
statute of limitations when received after that statute of limitations has run if the
claim is otherwise on time. 50 In other words, Ms. Anastasoff lost her claim
because she filed in what would be paradoxical to call the nick of time.
The Eighth Circuit's decision was based 5 on its decision in Christie v.
United States 52 -memorialized in an unpublished opinion issued eight years
44. See PETER GOODRICH, READING THE LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION To LEGAL
METHOD AND TECHNIQUES 186-208 (1986) (discussing generally legal rhetoric).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
Mar. 20,

Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 899, 905.
Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446 (8th Cir.
1992) (per curiam).
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before. Ms. Anastasoff argued, in an apparently faithful reading of Eighth
Circuit Rule 23A(i), which provided, inter alia, that "[u]npublished opinions
53
are not precedent," that the court of appeals was not bound to follow Christie.
The opinion gave Judge Richard Arnold, who, together with former D.C.
Circuit Judge Patricia Wald, has been the federal judge most public and
insistent in his criticism of one aspect 54 of the system of contemporary
institutionalized unpublication of judicial opinions-the designation of
unpublished opinions as nonprecedential 55-the opportunity, writing for the
panel, to hold Eighth Circuit Rule 23A(i) "unconstitutional under Article 1I,
because it purports to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the
'judicial.' 5 6 Ms. Anastasoff's petition for rehearing en banc raised the
constitutional issue, claiming in part that the constitutional holding was in
error, 57 and she argued on appeal that the case was not rendered moot, in part
because "the status of unpublished opinions is of great importance to the bar
and bench, 5 8 by the IRS's actions of paying her refund and issuing a ruling
announcing that it acquiesced in the Second Circuit's rule in Weisbartv. United
States59 that the Mailbox Rule could save claims like Ms. Anastasoff's. Yet
again, Ms. Anastasoff was unsuccessful: Judge Arnold, writing for the court en
banc, held his earlier opinion moot.6
Nonetheless, unlike its predecessor, In re Rules of the UnitedStates Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,Adopted November 18, 1986,61 which had
suggested that modem institutionalized unpublication might be rendered
unconstitutional on equal protection and due process grounds as well as
because it may be ultra vires of Article IH, Judge Arnold's opinion specifies the
basis of the ultra vires claim. For this reason and because Judge Kozinski's62
revisionist history of U.S. precedent in Hart seeks explicitly to contradict it,
its reasoning merits critical analysis.
53. Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000).
54. See Arnold, supra note 4, at 220-25 (discussing the designation of unpublished
opinions as nonprecedential); Wald, Rhetoric, supranote 4, at 1373-76 (same); Wald, Problem,
supra note 4, at 783 n.41 (same).
55. Anastasoff,223 F.3d at 899-904.
56. Id. at 899.
57. Anastasoffv. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000).
58. Id.
59. Weisbart v. United States, 222 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2000).
60. Anastasoff,235 F.3d at 1056.
61. In re Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Adopted Nov.
18, 1986, 955 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1992).
62. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Opening with powerful symbolism, Judge Arnold draws authority initially
from the jurisprudence of the Marbury Court,63 which reasoned that, "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret the rule." 64 This articulation of the nature of the common law
process-the articulation of rules and their interpretation in application in
subsequent cases, is followed rapidly by an appeal to the necessity to treat like
cases alike: "This... declaration of law.., must be applied in subsequent
cases to similarly situated parties.., 65 The opening argument also makes an
appeal to a significantly different discourse than the discourse of precedent as
iron-clad control on future courts and litigants mobilized by Judge Kozinski in
Hart:66 A court's "declaration of law" in each case "is. authoritative to the
67
extent necessary for the decision.,
Taken together, Judge Arnold opines, "[t]hese principles... form the
doctrine of precedent." 68 His next appeal to authority is to the understanding of
the Founders. Their understanding of precedent was that courts declare or
articulate rules (formulae that connote the legal fiction that common law judges
do not make law, but rather discern and announce previously existing legal
rules) and interpret them in each application. Similarly situated litigants must
69
be treated similarly and the iterativity of precedent is necessarily incremental.
The next step in Judge Arnold's reasoning, the claim of authority for his
holding of unconstitutionality on ultra vires grounds, is less well supported. He
cites the language of Article HI as his only direct support for the claim that
"[t]he Framers... considered these principles to derive from the nature of
judicial power, and intended that they would limit the judicial power delegated
to the courts by Article III of the Constitution. 70 Article ll's text-perhaps
merely descriptive, perhaps pregnant with connotation, merely provides that
"[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
63. Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-900 (8th Cir. 2000).
64. Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
65. Anastasoff,223 F.3d at 900.
66. Hart,266 F.3d at 1174.
67. Anastasoff,223 F.3d at 900.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 899-900 (stating that "every judicial decision is a declaration and
interpretation of a general principle or rule of law," which is "authoritative to the extent
necessary for the decision," and "must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated
parties").
70. Id. at 900.
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ordain and establish. '7 1 In a flurry of citations to authority, from Professor
Morton Horwitz to Sir William Blackstone to (simultaneously) Roman,
Norman, and the earliest of English Law, Judge Arnold bridges the gap
between his English sources of the doctrine of precedent and its embracing by
the Founders.7 2 Then, citing Coke, he essays the rhetorically powerful claim
that "assertion of the authority of precedent had been effective in past struggles
of the English people against royal usurpations, and for the rule of law against
the arbitrary power of government." 73 The Framers thus "had inherited a very
favorable view of precedent from the seventeenth century" via Coke. 74
He concludes that "the doctrine of precedent was not merely wellestablished [at the Nation's founding]; it was the historic method of judicial
decision-making, and well-regarded as a bulwark of judicial independence in
past struggles for liberty. "5 Judge Arnold next qualifies Coke as "the legal
authority most admired and most often cited by American patriots" and
impeaches the "only critic of the doctrine of precedent," Hobbes, "who
regarded the authority of precedent as an affront to the absolute power of the
Sovereign. 7 6 In a rhetorical gesture that is the equivalent of having one's cake
and eating it too, he then invokes but relegates to a footnote those modem
scholars who "tend to justify the authority of precedent on equitable or
prudential grounds" comprising "fundamental fairness, i.e., that like cases
should be treated alike;... the need for predictability; and.., as an aid to
judicial decision-making, to prevent unnecessary reconsideration of established
matters. 7 7 Judge Arnold simultaneously privileges the authority of the
eighteenth century (most influentially expounded by Blackstone), that "the
judge's duty to follow precedent derives from the nature of the judicial power
78

itself."

What follows is an argument for the inextricability ofjudicial power and
"the judge's duty to follow precedent. 7 9 This involves a complex interlinking
71.
72.

U.S. CONST. art III, § 1, cl. 1.

Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing MORTON J.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860, at 8-9 (1977); J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 227 (1990); Sir William Holdsworth, CaseLaw, 50
L.Q.R. 180 (1934); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69 (1765)).
HORWrrz,

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
(1987)).
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 900 n.6.
Id. at 901 n.7 (citing Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 595-602
Id. at 901.
Id.
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of the legal fiction that judges discover but do not make law; the concession
that this involves "not only choosing the appropriate legal principle but also
expounding and interpreting it"; and the claim that "[i]n determining the law in
one case, judges bind those in subsequent cases."80 Judge Arnold disaggregates
the concept of respect for precedent from the necessity for a published judicial
opinion, citing Blackstone as authority for the proposition that the "record of
the judicial proceedings and decision alone is sufficient evidence of the legal
principles necessary to support the decision."' 1 He concludes that "the judicial
power is limited by [precedents]," and then makes a claim for the 82
reception of
this eighteenth century British philosophy of law by the Framers.
Judge Arnold goes on rapidly to touch on otherjustificatory discourses for
the doctrine of precedent. It "keep[s] ... the law stable," and "is... essential
for the separation of legislative and judicial power."83 Invoking Blackstone,
Judge Arnold catalogs the implications of that aspect of separation of powers.
Judges constrained by the doctrine of precedent do not make law, unlike
legislators, and thus they avoid arbitrariness. 84 In this constraint "'consists [the]
one main preservative of public liberty."', 85 In a now-familiar rhetorical
gesture, Judge Arnold ascribes the view to the Framers, to Federalists and AntiFederalists alike, quoting extensively from Hamilton and Madison.8 6 He then
disaggregates symbolic authority of the record ofjudicial decisions from actual
authority. Given an ambient culture of "limited publication of judicial
opinions" historically, he claims, citing Coke and American sources from the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, "judges and lawyers of the day
recognized the authority of unpublished decisions even when they87were
established only by memory or a lawyer's unpublished memorandum.,
Judge Arnold's peroration again cites the eighteenth century and the
Framers, and adds the authority of Joseph Story for the proposition that "the
doctrine of precedent limits the 'judicial power' delegated to the courts in
Article 11.,' 88 He concludes his extensive quotation from Story noting that "'a
departure from [the doctrine of precedent] would have been deemed [by the
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 901 n.9.
Id. at 901 n.8.
Id. at 901.

84.

Id.

85. Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *258-59).
86. See id. at 901-03 nn.10-13 (quoting numerous sources that state that judicial
adherence to precedent is a guard against arbitrariness and threats to liberty).
87. Idat903n.14.
88. Id. at 903-04 n.14.

TAKE A LETTER, YOUR HONOR

1565

Framers] an approach to tyranny and arbitrary power, to the exercise of mere
discretion, and to the abandonment of all the just checks upon judicial
authority."89 Setting up a counter argument to the proposition that "[i]t is often
said among judges that the volume of appeals is so high that it is simply
unrealistic to ascribe precedential value to every decision. We do not have time
to do a decent enough job, the argument runs, when put in plain language, to
90
justify treating every opinion as a precedent," he concludes with a
combination of appeals to sense and reason and a rhetorical gesture as dramatic
as Story's:
If this is true, the judicial system is indeed in serious trouble, but the
remedy is not to create an underground body of law good for one place and
time only. The remedy, instead, is to create enough judgeships to handle
the volume, or, if this is not practical, for each judge to take enough time to
do a competent job with each case. If this means that backlogs will grow,
the price must still be paid. At bottom, rules like our Rule 28A(i) assert
that courts have the following power: to choose for themselves, from
among all the cases they decide, those that they will follow in the future,
and those that they need not. Indeed, some forms of the non-publication
rule even forbid citation. Those courts are saying to the bar: "We may
have decided this question the opposite way yesterday, but this does not
bind us today, and what's more, you cannot even tell us what we did
yesterday." As we have tried to explain in this opinion, such a statement
91
exceeds the judicial power, which is based on reason, not onfiat.
Thus, the proposed rule change would remove only the most embarrassing of
the effects of the system of institutionalized unpublication, but no more. It
would not address what Judge Arnold identifies as one of the significant
problems caused by modem institutionalized unpublication, the temptation
towards judicial misconduct and to an associated culture of duplicity that arises
from courts repeatedly failing to follow their own criteria for designating
92 There is a certain
certain opinions unpublished and thus unprecedential.
attractiveness to Judge Arnold's rhetoric of judicial rectitude and his call for
constraints on judicial power. This discourse runs dramatically counter to the
discourse of the necessity of judges prospectively controlling the law. It also
contradicts the judge-aggrandizing rationale of Judge Kozinski for a binary
system ofjudging that he says is necessitated by ironclad precedential opinions.
If judicial opinions or "reasons for judgment," however, depend for their
89.

See id. at 903-04 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, CoMMENTARiEs ON THE CONSTrrTmON OF
§§ 377-78 (1833)).

THE UNITED STATES

90.
91.

Id. at 904.
Id.

92.

Arnold, supranote 4, at 223-24.
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accuracy in accounting for what produced a judge's decision in any case on the
intellectual honesty, ethical awareness, and capacity for critical self-analysis
possessed by the individual judicial officer, little of value would be lost by
eliminating reasoning that seeks merely to constrain the future.
Judge Arnold's rhetoric rests on the authority of English jurisprudence of
the eighteenth century and that of the Framers, emphasizing both precedent's
control over judicial lawmaking, and the authority of the law and the people
versus that of capricious monarchs or judges. In contrast, Judge Kozinski's
rhetoric tells a story of modernity, of a doctrine of selectively rigid precedent
that has emerged in the United States federal courts, and is distinct from
common law precedent, and ofjudge as legislator who decides when the time
has come to attempt to bind those who follow to the letter of legal rules. And
as Anastasoff dealt with the precedential status of unpublished opinions, so
Hart deals with another of the obvious effects of modem institutionalized
unpublication. The issue arose as the result of an appeal.9 3 It had nothing to
do with the substance of the appeal. Rather, it was set in motion by the Ninth
Circuit's Notice to Show Cause issued to the appellant's attorney, which
required him to show cause why he should not be disciplined for citing an
unpublished opinion in his brief, contrary to 9th Cir. R. 36-3.94 The appellant's
attorney's response to the Notice to Show Cause was to argue that the rule
might be unconstitutional, as a result of Anastasoff.95 There is a certain
poignant irony in the fact that the unpublished opinion that caused the
controversy arose from an appeal by a social security applicant who might be
viewed as the paradigm of those on the margins of society whom modem
institutionalized unpublication structurally subordinates, and often explicitly
treats differently by assigning their appeals either characteristically or as a
matter of policy to the nonargument track. This means they may receive little
or even no judicial attention in their progress through Article 1II
courts. Carol
Z. Rice, the appellant in Rice v. Chater,96 was a forty-year-old woman with an
IQ of 79 and a range of medical problems who lived with her parents.97 Her
only jobs had been housekeeping for an uncle and babysitting at the rate of
"one dollar per day." 98 Not only is the subject matter of the offending
93. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001).
94. Id. at 1159.
95. Id.
96. Rice v. Chater, 98 F.3d 1346, 1996 WL 583605, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1996).
97. Id. at *1-2.
98. See id. at *1-3 (stating that appellant had been diagnosed as a malingerer by a
psychologist appointed by the ALJ who heard her application for supplemental security income
disability benefits, and was refused a supplemental hearing which would have enabled her to
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unpublished opinion poignantly apt, but there is also an equally apt irony that
Hart has nothing to say about the appeal in that case itself, being rather a
lengthy dissertation on judicial power.
Judge Kozinski opens by labeling Anastasoff s invitation to the bar to
breach Rule 36-3 seductive, and labels any alleged relevance of Anastasoff s
99 He
holding to Rule 36-3's constitutionality "mistaken" and speculative.
characterizes Judge Arnold's argument about Article 111 as "preclud[ing] ...
federal courts from making rulings that are not binding in future cases"; striking
at Judge Arnold's careful avoidance of the claim that common law judges make
he parses that as meaning that "they are required to
rather than discover the law,
'' °
make law in every case." 0
Judge Kozinski interposes a footnoted criticism of Judge Arnold's citation
of Story. He deems it read out of context. Judge Kozinski claims that context
limits the concept of binding precedent to the effect of the decisions of the
Supreme Court on the courts of the states.10 1 He then begins to articulate his
own theory of precedent, one which draws on the authority of a distinctively
American "modem legal system":
...Anastasoffoverstates the

case. Rules that empower courts of appeal to

issue nonprecedential decisions do not cut those courts free from all legal
rules and precedents; ...such rules have a much more limited effect: They
allow panels of the courts of appeals to determine whether future panels, as
well as judges of inferior courts of the circuit, will be bound by particular

engage with the psychologist's report, which the AU had decided to admit into evidence
although it had been obtained post-hearing). Flaws in the quality of the preparation of her case
meant that the expert who was available to testify about her mental impairments was not
qualified to do so. Id. at *6-7. Other qualified experts had not made the formal diagnosis
necessary to constitute "medical evidence." Id. These facts, combined with the ALJ's
conclusions about Ms. Rice's honesty led the Ninth Circuit to affirm the magistrate judge's
grant of a motion for summary judgment to the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration. Id. at *7-8.
99. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) (arguing that the
speculations of the Rice court were mistaken).
100. Id.at 1159-60 (emphasis in original).
at 1160 n.3 (stating that Story's argument about precedent was confined to the
101. See id.
supremacy of the Supreme Court over lower courts (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§§ 376-78 (1833))). Judge Arnold appears to get the

better of the contest here. While Judge Kozinski is right that the context concerns the power of
the Supreme Court, it is specifically directed towards the Supreme Court's pre-eminent power in
federal constitutional judicial review. Story goes on to make a generalized claim about the
operation of precedent in "the whole system ofjurisprudence" in a "government of laws, and not
of men." STORY, supra.
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rulings. This is hardly the same as turning our back on all precedents, or on
the concept of precedent altogether.10 2

It is worth noting, in light of Judge Kozinski's subsequent rule-controlling
discourse, that this passage suggests that the only genuine basis for the asserted
necessity to devote extensive time and craft to those few opinions deemed
precedential and thus published is foreclosing interpretability. This passage
10 3
also undermines the claim that the binary system produces consistency.
Judge Kozinski's focus is on the individual judge who writes published
opinions and on such a judge's authority.
Judge Kozinski then takes issue with Judge Arnold's claim that Article 111
judicial power is subject to an implied constitutional limitation which allows
courts to declare some of their decisions nonprecedential.' 4 Interspersed with
this portion of Judge Kozinski's argument is an appeal to the exigencies of
practicality and modernity10 5 and to the way in which the U.S. federal courts
have come to "do business. '1°6 This appeal is coupled with the claim that
"much of what the federal courts do could be modified or eliminated without
07
offending the Constitution." 1
Judge Kozinski then proceeds to caution against "freez[ing] the law into
the mold cast in the eighteenth century."'108 He catalogues and criticizes
eighteenth century U.S. judicial practices that have fallen into disuse, 10 9 and in
doing so calls into question the accuracy of Judge Arnold's account of the
doctrine of precedent at the time of the Framers. 10 Judge Kozinski then
effectively accuses Judge Arnold of intellectual bad faith in "pick[ing] and
choos[ing] those ancient practices [he] find[s] salutary as a matter of policy,
and give[s] them constitutional status.""' In a revealing aside, as this first
criticism is introduced, Judge Kozinski introduces a theme that recurs in the
102. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1160.
103. Judge Kozinski makes this point. Id. at 1179.
104. See id.
at 1160-62 nn.4-5 (arguing that Article III does not limit the power of courts
to issue nonprecedential opinions).
105. See id.at 1160-62 (enumerating the common practices of modem courts that differ
from earlier courts).
106. Id. at 1161 (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdictionof FederalCourts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1363-64
(1953)).
107. Id.
108. Id.at 1162.
109. See id.
(noting changes inthe law since the eighteenth century).
110. See id.
at 1162 n.6 (discussing the question of what weight was given to precedent at
the time of the Framing).
111. 1d.at1163.
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opinion: the virtues of judicial opinions speaking monologically, with one
authoritative voice that is resistant to future interpretivity. 12
Judge Kozinski then embarks on an elaborate exposition of the differences
between precedent at the time of the Framers and precedent in the modem
federal courts. The proposition that the "overwhelming consensus inthe legal
community has been that having appellate courts issue nonprecedential
decisions is not inconsistent with the exercise of the judicial power,"'1 13 is made
revealingly without citation to authority. The judge goes on to claim both that
contemporary conceptions ofprecedent are "stricter" than those of the Framers
and that, in any event, the reason that there is no "express prohibition against
that] ...the Framers would have seen
issuing nonprecedential opinions [is
14
nothing wrong with the practice."'
Judge Kozinski moves on to make a series of arguments for the elasticity
of precedent in the eighteenth century. Along the way, he casts scorn borrowed
from Austin on the legal fiction repeatedly, if obliquely, invoked by Judge
Arnold that the common law is "found" by the judges as the need for it arises.
Those arguments range from ones based on doctrinal pronouncements"' and
jurisprudential theories 116 to ones deriving from a range of claims about the
material practices of court hierarchy,1 7 reporting, 118 and the training' 19 of those
of
who purport to make the law. He then sources the conception of two classes 12
"precedent"-the binding and persuasive types-in the Exchequer Chamber. 0
He expands this distinction into that between "the law" and "the opinion of a

112. Id.at 1163 n.6 (opining that "[n]ine judges speaking separately may well agree on the
outcome of a case, but they cannot give the kind of specific guidance as to the conduct of future
cases that can be found in a single opinion speaking for the court").
113. Id.at 1163.
114. Id.
115. Id.at 1163 n.9.
116. Id.at 1164 n.8.
at 1164-65 & nn.10, 13 (quoting and citing R.W.M. DiAs, JuRiSPRUDENCE 30117. See id.
31 (1964); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONcIsE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 151, 162-63,

348 (1956)) (noting that a hierarchy of courts is a necessary prerequisite to the precedential
value of case law).
118. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1165-67 nn.9, 10, & 15-18 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citing numerous authorities for the proposition that common law judges had many different
justifications for not following precedent).
119. See id.at 1165 n.1 1, 1167 n. 19 (stating that the practice of law by laymen devalued
the precedential import of case law).
at 1165 n. 13 (arguing that the fact that decisions in the Exchequer Court were
120. See id.
considered binding precedent demonstrates that decisions outside that court were not generally
considered binding).
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judge," which might be mistaken,' 21 and makes a curious point that purports to
be a common law generalization: "For centuries, the most important sources of
law were not judicial opinions themselves, [because of scarcity] but treatises
that restated the law," but which his source limits to
"the first century of
22
Blackstone.1
on
reliance
jurisprudence['s]"
American
It seems likely that English law reports were scarcer in colonies than in
England itself, but this is beside the point. What it connotes is a U.S.
conception of the hardness of doctrine that is at the heart of Langdell's legal
science. Contemporary U.S. lawyers and judges are cast in the mold of
Langdell's doctrine by their education in its texts and pedagogical practices.
This conception is at one with Judge Kozinski's almost civilist understanding
of those legal texts as authoritative, and of those of judges as generally not.
This aspect of Judge Kozinski's theory of precedent becomes more visible
when he is unable to differentiate methodologically between a court's
generation of binding and persuasive precedent. 123 What differentiates the U.S.
federal courts' precedential system from that of the common law,' 24 on his
account, is that the former binds the future, the latter is bound to follow the
past.
This aspect of Judge Kozinski's habitus 125 becomes increasingly visible as
he moves to the heart of his revisionist doctrine of U.S. precedent. Judge
Kozinski's discourse about the Framers' attitude towards judicial officers
differs sharply from Judge Arnold's discourse. It replaces one on being ruled
by law and protecting citizens against the excesses of the ruler, with one about
government officers whose power was the subject of "contestation.' 126 The
flexibility-originating in its derivation from custom-of English common law
is used to suggest that Judge Kozinski's and thus modernity's theory of
precedent is more rigid than that of the Framers.127 It also leads into the
"modern" view, placed-possibly strategically-in the mouths of lawyers and
8
not of Judge Kozinski himself, that judges make rather than discover the law.12
121. Id.at 1165.
122. Id at 1165-66&n.14.
123. See id.at 1172 (stating that "controlling authority has much in common with
persuasive authority").
124. See id.at 1165 n. 13 (noting the persuasive nature of common law decisions).
125. See BouRDmu, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE, supra note 17, at 52 (defining habitus as a
system of structured, structuring dispositions).
126. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1167 n.20 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that at time
of the Framing, the concept of precedent was subject to debate).
127. See id.at 1167 (stating that common law "was a reflection of custom, and custom had
built-in flexibility").
128. See id.
at 1168 (stating that lawyers "began to believe that judges made, not found, the
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This combination of the acknowledgment that judges make law and the
of
emergence of opinion reporting is cited as the grounds for the emergence
29
precedent."
"binding
time-as
first
the
for
if
judicial opinions-as
Judge Kozinski then briefly introduces an argument on which he relies
heavily later in the opinion to justify modem institutionalized unpublication,
the topic of the final part of the opinion. He notes the difficulty of judges
informing themselves about a burgeoning body of precedent and the necessity
for prudent judges to "keep the law clean," as their English predecessors did by
adopting selective reporting of opinions. He elaborates on the binary classes of
persuasive and binding opinions 130 and begins to differentiate the common law
from the system of precedent that operates in the contemporary U.S. federal
courts. 13 1 He does this in part by emphasizing the hierarchical system of
precedent that operates in federal courts, 32 and in part by explicitly articulating
an argument central to his discourse on precedent. Binding authority--"very
powerful medicine"' 3 3-must be crafted using "precise language," 134 via a
process of"collegial[ity]"' 135 so that the court speaks with one voice, rather than
admitting of dissent-or dialogue.
Judge Kozinski then pairs an argument about the disorder that would
ensue if the federal courts' system of differentiating binding and persuasive
precedent was abandoned with an insistence on his view that this system is
merely a matter of policy choice and not a constitutional matter.1 36 The crux of
these paired arguments is that if Article III courts must constitutionally follow
precedent, rather than determine which opinions are precedential and which are
not as a matter of policy, then this would apply to the federal district courts. On

law").
129. Id.
130. See id. at 1174 n.30 (providing a summary of the role that persuasive and binding
authority plays in judicial opinions).
131. See id. at 1165 n.13 (claiming that at common law, binding precedent was only
created by the Exchequer Chamber, and that circuit judges regularly decided cases without
referring to reporters).
132. See id. at 1170-73 (explaining that Supreme Court opinions serve as binding
precedent for all federal courts, and circuit courts must follow previous decisions within the
circuit, unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the circuit in an en banc ruling, but that the
circuit courts are not bound by the decisions of other circuits).
133. Id.at ll71.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1171 n.26.
136. See id.at 1174, 1176 n.30 (stating that courts would operate much less efficiently if
not required to follow binding authority, and noting that in California "court of appeal panels
are not bound by the opinions of other panels, even those within the same district").
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Judge Kozinski's account, those courts do not have the power to issue binding
precedent (as a matter of policy choice).
This argument has two flaws. First, if Judge Arnold is eventually proven
right, the matter is one of an absence of constitutional power to decide which
opinions are precedential and which are not. Then indeed, the district courts,
on those occasions when judges rather than juries decide cases, would likewise
lack the power to determine precedential status via fiat and would be obliged to
follow precedent within the structure of that common law commonplace, an
hierarchical system of appellate justice. The potential results would be a
corrective to the rule of law and structural subordination problems that follow
the present system of institutionalized unpublication. Those problems include,
most obviously, arbitrariness and its various collateral costs-those which
derive from disrespect for the judiciary, the courts, and the law. Further,
because the United States federal courts, like their common law predecessors,
follow a system of precedent that depends in part on court hierarchy and a
differentiation between trial and appellate jurisdiction and function, the extent
to which federal district court judges would have a disruptive law-divining,
-declaring, or -making function (depending on one's view of how common law
decisionmaking characteristically operates) seems extremely limited. This is
especially true given the much more widespread use of juries in fully litigated
matters in the United States than elsewhere in the common law world,
particularly in civil cases. Error correction, after all, is an integral part of
"writing the law."
The fimal part of the opinion opens with a reiteration of the claim that
binding precedent is a creation of the United States federal courts that postdates
both Article III and English common law, 137 this time, however, introduced in a
way that is a harbinger of Judge Kozinski's Janus-faced discourse on various
aspects of the system of modem institutionalized unpublication. One paragraph
opens with the statement that while "the principle of precedent was well
established in the common law courts... we do not agree that it was known
138
and applied in the strict sense in which we apply binding authority today."'
Yet near the end, it concedes the proposition that "[t]he concept of binding case
precedent, though it was known at common law, was used exceedingly
sparingly." 139 This latter claim is supported only by an earlier footnote that
extremely selectively and indeed tendentiously parses140 Plucknett's account of
137.
common
138.
139.
140.

See id. at 1174-75 (stating that binding precedent did not play the same role in
law courts, or courts at the time the Constitution was written, as it does today).
Id.
Id.
Id. Plucknett's discussion is an historical one that articulates the passage from the
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the effect of proceedings of the Court of Exchequer Chamber as evidence that
"1clearly suggests common law judges knew the distinction between binding and
persuasive precedent."' 14 1 What ensues is a discourse on the rigidity of the
"Year Book period" to "The Age of the Reporters." Specifically, in a complex and fairly
sophisticated discussion about the changing roles of "custom" and "precedent" in constituting
the law, he differentiates between the practice of the Year Book period, during which "cases
[were] used only as evidence of the existence of a custom of the court," and the view that
emerged in the seventeenth century that a decision of all the judges of England in the Exchequer
Chamber "was a binding precedent." THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 347-48 (5th ed. 1956). Plucknett's discussion continues with a look at the
modem view of binding precedent which emerged in the nineteenth century. Id.at 349-50. He
also notes elsewhere that "[w]hile it lasted, the Court of Exchequer Chamber did much to take
the place of a system of appellate courts" before such a system developed, although it differed
from them in only being able to be set in train by judges rather than parties. Id.at 163. Thus,
Plucknett's point is about the authoritativeness of texts and courts and about the complexities of
the paradox of common law's dual origins in "custom" and the unitary law of the land rather
than of "law" in the contemporary sense. I should note both that I am aware that adjudging
competing truth claims is risky in context and that it is not my point here. My point is that
within a range of tolerance shaped by the habitus of lawyers and the judges some of them
become, precedent is as binding, persuasive, or interpretable as one chooses to make it. Further,
institutional decisions by courts about the degree to which they formally bind successor or
inferior courts or for that matter decisions akin to those a court like the Court of Exchequer
Chamber or the Supreme Court makes when it settles issues of legal interpretation about which
there are differing views between lesser courts or among judges (all of which we will assume for
the sake of argument more or less approach the law ethically rather than what I willtendentiously-call tendentiously) are of a different order from judges being able to pick and
choose which of their own decisions are on the books and to which they are obliged to pay any
interpretive fealty and which they are free to depart from in like circumstances. There is also a
question of selective citation as well as interpretation of precedents. See, e.g., GOODRICH, supra
note 44, at 71-72 (summarizing the history of precedential citation in England). Goodrich
notes:

It was, however, only with the aid of principles drawn from the academies and the
civil law, that the common law [in England, which, it is worth noting, unlike the
United States does not have a written constitution and where courts applying
British law have no power to declare acts of government unconstitutional] could be
developed into a coherent and largely self-sufficient system of legal decisionmaking. In 1861, in Beamish v. Beamish... the House of Lords decided that
precedent decisions of the House were to be binding in future cases, even upon the
House itself ...[This] view.., remained the law until in 1966 the House of Lords
issued a Practice Statement declaring that, in a limited number of circumstances,
'the House would no longer be bound to follow its earlier decisions. The lower
courts, the Court of Appeal in particular, however, remain bound by their own
earlier decisions and the system of precedent in general is still doctrinally stated to
be one of binding or strict precedent.
Id. Or at least it was until the British courts followed the lead of the U.S. in 2001 and required
lawyers to seek courts' permission before citing unreported opinions to them. See Pether,
Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 4, at 1439 n. 1 (noting the new limitation on citing
unreported opinions).
141. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1165 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001).
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doctrine of binding precedent and the power of the unitary opinion. Binding
precedent in the federal courts is "strict,"'142 provides "rigid constraint,"'143 and is
144 The "single
"the backbone of much of the federal judicial system today."
45
law."1
of
rule
case... [is] sufficient to establish a particular
Moving on to complicate this discourse in articulating his case for
selective rather than strict binding precedent, Judge Kozinski has a little
suggestive-indeed perhaps cynical-"originalist" fun at the expense of
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey.146
He suggests that the system of selective binding precedent gives originalists the
capacity to depart from precedents that are unconstitutional. 147 He also begins
the discourse on quality that is used near the opinion's end to justify selective
rather than strict binding precedent by proposing that strict binding precedent is
flawed by mere priority in cases where the lawyers who are the first to raise a
point are inadequate. 148 Let us leave aside for now the logical problems in
squaring a claim for the necessity for "binding precedent" of any stripe with a
system where judges can effectively do whatever they like, to whomever they
like, whenever they feel like it, because only they have the power to say what
counts as precedent and what does not. Instead, let us focus on what is valued
here, the authority of the individual court. Indeed, it is often the power of the
individual judge, given the power of the drafter, on Judge Kozinski's account,
to constrain future interpretability and achieve the univocality of a published
"single opinion speaking for the court" that he privileges. 149 This power may
often be cynically bargained for or be the product of forced consensus.' 50
Judge Kozinksi's peroration at once anatomizes the published opinion and
seeks to account for the necessity of modern institutionalized unpublication on
efficiency grounds. The system of unpublished opinions is legislative,
bespeaking a codifying impulse. It aims to "develop... a coherent and
internally consistent body of caselaw to serve as binding authority ....
142. ld. at 1174.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1175.
145. Id. at 1174-75.
146. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994).
147. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1175 n.31 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that rigid
adherence to the principle of binding precedent "forces judges in certain instances to act in ways
they may consider to be contrary to the Constitution").
148. Id.
149. Id.at1162n.6.
150. See, e.g., Pether, InequitableInjunctions, supra note 4, at 1487 (noting that some
judges agree not to dissent in a case as long as the opinion is not published).
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Precedential opinions are meant to govern... future cases .... ,, 15 1 Their
drafters must remove those facts which might "provide a spurious basis for
distinguishing the case in the future" and "envision the countless permutations
of facts that might arise in the universe of future cases. 1 52 This "solemn
judicial act" takes a lot of time to do, Judge Kozinski reasons. Judges cannot
be expected to do it in every case, but only in a "manageable number of cases,"
153
consigning the others to "unpublished dispositions and judgment orders."'
Judge Kozinski goes on to make claims for the quality of those
unpublished dispositions and for their judicial authorship. Those claims will be
subject to a rather different kind of discourse analysis in Part III of this Article.
Suffice it to say at this point that consigning to a footnote the possibility of
"irresponsible and unaccountable practices" enabled by the two-tiered system of
judging is troubling. The same applies to a highly selective choice of sources
used to substantiate the claim that judges are kept "honest" by the current
system.' m There are many authorities, among them federal judges, who have
expressed radically differing views.1 55 Indeed, a recent study shows a pattern
among Democratic appointees to the Ninth Circuit of deciding asylum cases
56
with published opinions differently from those with unpublished opinions. 1
More troubling still is a claim by the most public proponent of maintaining
what is arguably the least significant and the least problematic of the various
highly problematic aspects of modem institutionalized unpublication: citation
bans. This claim alleges that because "acase is decided without a precedential
opinion does not mean it is not fully considered, or that the disposition does not
reflect a reasoned analysis of the issues presented .... An unpublished
151. Hart, 266F.3dat 1176.
152. Id.
153. Id.at 1177. The question of this emergent third category of judicial decisions,
"judgment orders," is a matter for another day, but the recent report emanating from the Federal
Judicial Center on the proposed rule change suggests that it is here and not in unpublished
opinions that most of the decisions of the federal court are currently "memorialized" (ifI might
be excused a pun that would be merely exasperated were the stakes of judicial ethics in a
constitutional system providing for judicial review of the constitutionality of governmental
actions not so high). REAGAN ET AL., supranote 5, at 70.
154. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1178 n.35 (9th Cir. 2001).
155. See, e.g., Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 4, at 1487-88 (pointing to an
example in which the decision whether to publish an opinion was based on which clerk needed
to author an opinion to aid in future employment searches, and to cases where judges have used
unpublished opinions as a means of punishing litigants and lawyers).
156. See David S. Law, StrategicJudicialLawmaking: Ideology, Publication,andAsylum
Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 817, 864-66 (2005) (concluding that the decision
whether or not to publish a judicial opinion has a significant impact on how some judges vote
on the merits of a case).
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disposition is, more or less, a letter from the court to parties familiar with the
15 7
facts, announcing the result and essential rationale of the court's decision."
What makes it troubling is that I am familiar with what is revealed by a cursory
search of what is made available as a result of the Ninth Circuit's
implementation of a recent federal law 58 apparently requiring the federal courts
to post all of their unpublished opinions on their websites in "text searchable
format."' 159 Take, for example, the following unpublished opinion issued by a
panel of the Ninth Circuit:
Miguel Nava Rivas seeks reversal of his conviction of three counts:
(1) conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841 (a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and 846; (2) possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, and aiding others to do the same, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B)(vii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (3) conspiracy to import marijuana,
21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), 960(b)(2), and 963. Rivas asserts that
there was insufficient evidence to sustain any of these three counts.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a
rational trier of fact could have found each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 829 (9th Cir.
1992). Rivas also challenges the admission of testimony by the
government's expert witness. The district court did not abuse its discretion,
let alone commit plain error, United States v. Alattorre, 222 F.3d 1098,
1100 (9th Cir. 2000), by admitting the witness testimony.
AFFIRMED ....

01

Judge Kozinski himself has criticized a judge who "offered nothing at all
to justify his actions-not a case, not a statute, not a bankruptcy treatise, not a
law review article, not a student note, not even a blawg," and has criticized
federal judges who "refuse ... to give reasons for
[their] actions" and praised
61
those who "give ... reasons for [their] orders."'
In closing, this part of the Article has suggested that Judge Kozinski's
revisionist history of precedent is, in his view, that the United States federal
157.

Hart,266 F.3d at 1177-78.

158. Circuits can apparently indefinitely defer compliance with the requirement.
159. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347 (codified at 44 U.S.C § 3501 Sec.
205(a)(5)).
160. United States v. Rivas, No. 03-10594 (9th Cir. Oct. 14, 2004), available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts. gov/coa/memdispo.nsf/pdfview/071505/$File/03-10594.pdf. Many
unpublished opinions merely affirm without giving any reasons for the decision. See Pether,
InequitableInjunctions,supra note 4, at 1465 n. 139 (pointing to estimates that concluded that
about 7% of all opinions issued in the federal courts of appeal are one-word opinions).
161. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No.03-89031, slip op. 29,34 (9th Cir. Sept.
29, 2005) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (memorandum).
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courts are not common law courts. They claim much more power for the judge
and manifest much less tolerance for the messiness of interpretability that
differentiates the common from the civil law. Part III of this Article compares
the final section of Hartwith other texts to explore the implications of Judge
Kozinski's model of the judge and his power, which diverge so significantly
from those mobilized by Judge Arnold. The conclusion is that in Hart,Judge
Kozinski is asking us to take a lot on trust, and that the record invites a decision
against him.
II. DissentingJudgment
What is here meant by the common law, a term with multiple meanings?
In this Article, common law refers to law that is judge-made (or interpreted,
which this Article takes to be the self-same thing). It means a practice of lawmaking with a curious double heritage. The first is rooted in a colonial power's
attempt to entrench state power by standardizing and centralizing law that until
then had been both decentralized and normatively responsive to local
63
conditions. 62 The second heritage is the ideological commitment to custom
and the material practices associated with the transmission and application of
customary law and involved in the habituation and training of lawyers and
judges on the one hand, and the practices of circuit-riding on the other.164 The
latter inculcated in the elite (white male) members of the inner bar, who still
overwhelmingly become common law judges, a culture of independence-we
might call it dissent-and of a professional amour propre fashioned on the
fantasy of or desire for what the late Jacques Derrida famously called "the
possibility ofjustice" (in her infinite variability).
The first of these manifestations of judicial culture is one that Prime
Minister Blair has had to recently confront, to his cost, in the person of Lord
Irvine of Lairg. Lord Irvine, the former Lord Chancellor and Prime Minister
Blair's former pupil-master, provided leadership for the House of Lords'65
opposition to the British government's proposed antiterrorist legislation.
162. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARmIEs *416 (mentioning the Saxon
efforts to reduce the power of local courts and extend the jurisdiction of the King's courts);
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 79 (2d ed., Little Brown & Co. 1899) (noting that a "good deal" of
English law was in writing at the time of the Norman Conquest).
163. See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCtENT CONSTITUTION AND FEUDAL LAW: A STuDY
OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 31 (2d ed. 1987).

164.
165.

supra note 44, at 42 (1986).
Greg Hurst, Lords Revolt Over Anti-terrorBill, TIMES (London), Mar. 8, 2005, at 6.
GOODRICH,
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This opposition led to the locating of decisionmaking power to circumscribe
what we might call civil liberties or due process-specifically the issuing ofany
type of "control order" rather than only "orders for house arrest, which would
require derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights"-in the
bench rather than the executive arm of government, as the Prime Minister had
wanted. The second manifestation is not unrelated to the first: The clearest
articulation of its spirit is found in the suggestion of the distinguished New
Zealand jurist Lord Cooke of Thorndon that even in those common law
countries without constitutionally entrenched, written Bills of Rights, there are
individual rights beyond the reach of government that the common law
judiciary is bound to protect. 166
Of specific concern is the phenomenon of enemy combatant cases that
emerged from the Supreme Court's last term. 167 This resulted in a decision in a
subsequent enemy combatant case by Judge Joyce Hens Green of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, 168 a court in the D.C. Circuit,
166. See N.Z. Drivers' Ass'n v. N.Z. Road Carriers, [1982] 1 N.Z.L.R. 374, 390
(questioning "the extent to which in New Zealand even an Act of Parliament can take away the
right of citizens to resort to the ordinary Courts of law for determination of their rights"). This
is a clear articulation of a view of constitutional judicial power and responsibility perhaps
obliquely suggested in Carolene Products' over-determined footnote 4. See United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) (describing a possible "narrower scope for
operation of a presumption of unconstitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibitionof the Constitution" (emphasis added)).
167. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004) (reversing and remanding
consideration of Padilla's petition for writ of habeas corpus for entry of an order of dismissal
without prejudice on jurisdictional grounds, and thus not reaching the Government's appeal for
review on the merits of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision to grant Padilla the writ
of habeas corpus); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that due process
requires a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant "must receive notice of the
factual basis for his classification [as an enemy combatant], and a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker").
168. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 464 (D.D.C. 2005)
(holding, inter alia,that the Fifth Amendment right to due process applied to detainees held as
"enemy combatants" at Guantanamo Bay, and that the petitioners had stated a claim for
violation of due process based in insufficiency of notice of factual bases for their detention and
denial of the opportunity to challenge it). But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 36 (D.C.
Cir. 2005), cert. granted,2005 WL 2922488 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2005) (reversing District Court
decision that Hamdan "could not be tried by a military commission unless a competent tribunal
determined that he was not a prisoner of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention"); Khalid v.
Bush, 355 F. Supp.2d 311, 321, 330 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding, inter alia, that the separation of
powers made it impermissible for courts to inquire into the conditions of executive detention of
non-resident aliens captured and detained outside the United States, and that these detainees
have no legally cognizable rights). See also Al-Joudi v. Bush, No. Civ.A. 05-301 (GK), slip.
op. 2005 WL 774847, at *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2005) (granting Saudi detainees' motion for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requiring respondents to provide counsel
for petitioners and the court with thirty days advance notice of any intended removal from
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which comparatively recently ended citation bans on unpublished (and still
formally nonprecedential) opinions. It is a circuit whose judges opined, albeit
anonymously, that they did so because they did not like secret law and which
produced the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who is said to favor
the end of citation bans and who will need to address FRAP 32.1.169 It is also a
circuit that produced the former Judge Wald, who, apart from the late Judge
most trenchant, frank, and courageous
Richard Arnold, has perhaps been the
70
judicial opponent of unpublication.
That circuit also numbers among its judges David Tatel, who on February
15, 2005, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller,17 1 invoked Lewis
Powell, an alumnus of Washington and Lee University, 172 and a Federal Rule,
in this case, Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 173 Judge Tatel took a
doctrinal step that seems to be an equivalent of Lord Cooke's in this nation's
Guantanamo); Qassim v. Bush, 382 F. Supp. 2d 126, 129 (D.D.C. 2005) (ordering hearing for
purposes of determining conditions under which Uighur Guantanamo detainees who had been
found not to be enemy combatants would live pending their relocation to another country);
Associated Press v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 2005 WL 2065171, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (ruling that
Department of Defense required to question detainees as to whether they wished information
about their identities to be released to Associated Press). But see Almurbati v. Bush, 366 F.
Supp. 2d 72, 82 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying motion by Bahraini detainees for preliminary
injunction prohibiting respondents from transferring any of them from Guantanamo without first
providing advance written notice); Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680, 682 (D.S.C.
2005) (holding that the Authorization for Use of Military Force allowed for a Quatari national's
detention and denying his motion for summary judgment on his petition for the writ of habeas
corpus); Paracha v. Bush, 374 F. Supp. 2d.'l18, 121 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying Guantanamo
detainee's motion for preliminary injunction ordering his removal from isolation and prohibiting
his rendition to the custody of another country where he may face the threat of torture and
motion for permission to proceed and appeal in forma pauperis); O.K. v. Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d
102, 118 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying Canadian national detainee at Guantanamo's motion for
preliminary injunction barring government from subjecting him to torture or interrogation and a
preliminary injunction ordering the government to provide his counsel and the court with thirty
days' notice prior to transferring him to a foreign country); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397
(4th Cir. 2005) (holding that the President possessed authority to detain enemy combatant).
169. See Tony Mauro, Judicial ConferenceSupports CitingUnpublishedOpinions,LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, at 12 (quoting then Judge Roberts as saying that lawyers "ought to be
able to tell a court what it has done"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (stating "[t]he Supreme
Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure for... courts of
appeals").
170. See generally Wald, Rhetoric, supra note 4; Wald, Problem, supra note 4.
171. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
172. See id. at 987 (recommending a "case by case" approach to a possible constitutional
qualified privilege for journalists in the grand jury context (citing Branzburg v. Miller, 408 U.S.
665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring))).
173. See id. at 989 ("[A]uthorizing federal courts to develop evidentiary privileges in
federal question cases according to 'the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted.., in the light of reason and experience."').
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curious constitutional context. 174 Judge Tatel concluded that a common law
First Amendment privilege for journalists in relation to grand jury proceedings
"remains open,"' 75 and that failing to recognize the privilege "shirk[s] the
common law function assigned by Rule 501 and 'freeze[s] the law. ' " 76 The
use to which I am putting Judge Tatel's doctrinal work perhaps 177 sits uneasily
with an opinion with redacted sections. To the extent that it does, it might be
seen to be a legal text that explicitly balances the conflict between the
possibilities and necessity of common law-making, and its abandonment in the
interests of control on the one hand and judicial power exercised in its own
interests on the other (which may be much the same thing). And it does so at a
critical moment in the development of the nation's common law and the
constitution of its judiciary. Judge Tatel's model of the far reaches of the
power of the common law judge is a model that discerns the legal authority for
such power in the face of government attempts to circumscribe the "rights" of
individuals in the interest of executive powers. It does not profess ignorance of
evidence of inequality effects or of costs to rule of law discourse in the interests
of asserting the power to treat some classes of citizens differently from others,
174. And who has also criticized citation bans, although not the binary opposition of
precedential and unprecedential decisions. See David S. Tatel, Some Thoughts on Unpublished
Decisions, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 815, 816-17 (1996) (evaluating potential advantages and
disadvantages of lifting citation bans).
175. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cit. 2005).
176. Id. at 995 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
177. There is the alternative view that the redactions (which in any event in the context of
alleged illegal leaks from the Executive are perhaps less problematic than they seem at first
blush to be) explicitly foreground silence, rather than covering absences in public information
with claims that only the litigants have an interest in the information and that it is in any event
both available to them and to the public. Further, this is all in a context in which federal
appellate courts issue unpublished memorandum decisions which give no reasons for the court's
decision and that some circuits' (including the 9th) implementation of the E-Government Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347 (codified at 44 U.S.C § 3501 Sec. 205(a)(5))'s requirement that their
opinions be published on their websites in a "text searchable format" involves them listing on
their websites memorandum opinions that may only be meaningfully searched if one knows the
matter number, the case name, or the date of disposition, providing no other means of searching
the database of unpublished opinions. I should also note that the differing "truth claims" of
Judges Arnold and Kozinski on whether common law judges discover or make the law are both
from my perspective neither here nor there. The critical difference between their versions of the
doctrine of precedent is rather their competing views about the power of courts to disregard
their earlier decisions by fiat as a result of the regime of modern institutionalized unpublication.
Further, there is in this context a real if superficially subtle difference between judges who seek
to curtail the power of executive government to interfere with citizens' protection from its unfair
use of power and those who seek to assert their own power to behave unfairly, beyond the reach
of any check or balance. I should also note my awareness of double irony inherent in the fact
that what Miller was seeking to protect was a right to keep secret information from the
Executive which had allegedly in its turn leaked "secret" information.
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to treat similarly-situated persons differently, and to apply the law it makes or
discovers or not, as it pleases. It is, in short, a discourse of the common law as
both responsive to appeals to its authority and as appealing to a rhetoric of
responsibility. Discourse Analysis concerns itself with regularly occurring
cultural stories that both produce the individual habitus, and, of most relevance
to my use of it in this part, with "look[ing] for the external conditions of [a
prompting us to ask
discourse's] existence, its appearance and its regularity,"
78
that.0
think
to
that,
know
to
possible
it
is
"how
Why does this article conclude that we have ceased to be a common law
country? Because we are normalizing and rendering normative a judicial
culture that has replaced constitutive investments in judicial independence and
various rule of law effects with one that is heedless of the call of Lord Cooke,
and that frequently betrays a combination of cynicism and disingenuousness.
Some better placed to know what goes on behind the closed doors of chambers
have described conduct that merits the label corruption. 179 It seems, however,
most tellingly and troublingly to manifest a lack of comprehension and valuing
of the enormous responsibility of the common law judicial office in AngloAmerican constitutional democracies.
Before moving to a critical discourse analysis of a series of texts authored
by Judge Kozinski and others with privileged access to the workings of modem
institutionalized unpublication, consider some concrete and particular facts.
Just under 80% 180 of the opinions of the United States Courts of Appeals are
unpublished. This fact alerts us to another: This is where and how most
"common," or more accurately, judge-made law is presently being forged.
This signifies first that such opinions are difficult to research. That
difficulty is exacerbated by lack of both economic resources and the legal
version of "cultural capital" possessed by repeat-player law practices or
practices which act for well-resourced repeat player litigants. 18 Second, it
178. See Pether, CriticalDiscourseAnalysis, supra note 30, at 60 (citing to unpublished
manuscript).
179. See, e.g., Wald, Rhetoric, supranote 4, at 1374 (opining that modem institutionalized
unpublication "allows for deviousness and abuse").
180. In 2000, it averaged 79.8 %; the Fourth Circuit led at 90.5%. See Pether, Inequitable
Injunctions, supra note 4, at 1436, 1437 n.5, 1465 n.139 (pointing to estimates provided by
Judge Margaret McKeown of the Ninth Circuit).
181. See id.at 1465-67 nn.141 & 144 (explaining that court websites do not often provide
a convenient means of searching unpublished opinions, and that only those unpublished
opinions that are released for publication ever make it into the Federal Appendix, LEXIS, or
Westlaw); see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1169 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that
searching for unpublished decisions is difficult). Many lawyers who claim that they routinely
search unpublished opinions on LEXIS or Westlaw are clearly not aware of the likely limitation
of the universe of material they have access to.
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signifies that-contrary to the frequent apologist claims that citation bans are
confined to a few places-in most state and federal courts, citing unpublished
opinions back to the court that decided them (except in extraordinarily narrow
circumstances, and even then, in only some jurisdictions) 8 2 is forbidden and thus
sanctionable.18 3 Finally, it signifies that these decisions are, almost everywhere,
rendered formally "non-precedential."84
All this occurred through the doubled development of screening and
institutionalized unpublication in federal courts during the latter half of the 20th

century. 8 5 The practice was justified by the claim that the volume of precedent
prevented indexing by courts' law libraries, 8 6 a problem that technology could
now potentially solve, if the judges would cooperate.18 7 Citation bans were also
188
justified by the claim that the volume of precedent had become overwhelming,
a weak claim given that contemporary research suggests that good judges and
89
lawyers routinely research unpublished opinions if they can get access to them.1
There was also, as I have written, a secret history underpinning these
developments in case management technology, namely, judicial anger and disdain
in response to the implementation of Brown and the contemporary revolution in
the rights of criminal defendants and those convicted of crimes.' 90
Numerous contemporary justifications for maintaining the various
practices that constitute institutionalized unpublication, (including screening,
citation bans, and so on) are extended. A frequent claim is that judicial time
will be saved by circumscription of the legal research universe. This is a
182. These generally include res judicata, collateral estoppel, law of the case, and double
jeopardy.
183. See Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supranote 4, at 1536-79 (citing publication and
citation rules that govern state courts).
184. Id.
185. See id. at 1445-64, 1449 n.62 (providing an overview of the development of
institutionalized unpublication and screening in federal courts).
186. See id. at 1444 (noting that during the 1960s and 1970s, judges argued that indexing
all judicial opinions could be an overwhelming task).
187. See id. at 1516 (pointing to courts' reluctance to provide adequate search tools for
unpublished opinions).
188. See id. at 1443-44 (noting the Federal Judicial Conference's use of this rationale in
the 1960s and 1970s).
189. See id. at 1487 n.288 (explaining that many practicing lawyers and judges research
unpublished opinions when possible); REAGAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 16-17 (noting that a
large percentage of lawyers find that unpublished opinions are useful when they are allowed to
cite them).
190. See Pether,Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 4, at 1444-45, 1517n.481 (explaining
the influence that the increase in civil rights and prisonerpro se appeals had on decisions not to
publish opinions).
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questionable proposition both because at least some judges appear not to do
much of the research themselves, and because, as Lauren Robel's work
suggests, those who do routinely research as much of the corpus of unpublished
authority as they can get their hands on.' 91 Another claim is that judges have
insufficient time to produce more than a few publishable-quality opinions, 192 a
claim contestable given: the relatively low opinion-writing rate of U.S. judges
by international standards; their unique reliance on clerks and staff attorneys to
do much of their writing; 193 the fact that some of the most ardent proponents of
this view are also trenchantly opposed to any expansion in the size of the
Article HI judiciary1 94 and that, at least in one notable case, seem to devote
considerable time to writing things other than opinions-video-game reviews
for the Wall Street Journal, for example.1 95 The last justification, "lawcleaning," is, on closer examination, a discourse of control or circumscription
of the possibilities of development of the common law in response to the many
appeals that diverse culture produces.
What emerges from the history constructed by proponents of modem
institutionalized unpublication and their discourse of justification for its
continuation is a gap between what is spoken and unspoken, between those
seeking to maintain the status quo and those with no such investments, as
between published and unpublished opinions. As I will go on to suggest,
parallel with this double discourse is a gap between the "public" and "private"
utterances from some members of the judiciary on the subject ofunpublication.
In The Epistemology of the Closet, Sedgwick is explicitly concerned with
theorizing, selectively mapping, and reading deconstructively the emergence of
the binary pair "heterosexual/homosexual" in the late nineteenth-century. Her
thesis is that "many of the major nodes of thought and knowledge in twentiethcentury Western culture as a whole are structured-indeed, fractured-by a
chronic, now endemic crisis of homo/heterosexual definition,"196 and that this
191. See id. at 1487, 1517 n.288 (pointing out that many lawyers and judges read
unpublished opinions).
192. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155,1177 nn.32-33 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating
that few, if any, courts have the resources to write publishable opinions in every case).
193. See Pether, InequitableInjunctions,supra note 4, at 1533 (mentioning that judges in
other common law "first-world democracies" rely less on clerks than do United States federal
judges).
194. See id. at 1518 n.491, 1532-33 (noting the opposition to an increase in the number of
federal judges that exists in some parts of the federal bench).
195. See Alex Kozinski, Puzznic and Other Video Enigmas,WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1991, at
A20; Guide to Nintendo Shopping, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1990, at A16 (exemplifying Judge
Kozinski's other writing projects).
196. SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 1.
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"nominally marginal... set of definitional issues" is central "to the important
knowledges and understandings of twentieth-century Western culture as a
whole." 197 Sedgwick's analysis serves as a paradigm for a binary definitional
system that has come to characterize the production of common law in the
United States since the middle of the twentieth century. This is applicable
specifically since Brown's desegregation mandate saw a largely constitutionally
racist southern judiciary, embodied in the judges of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, imagine an institutional substitute for Jim
Crow. 198 Race is as constitutive of the culture of the United States as the
"epistemology of the closet" is of twentieth-century western culture, something
that Sedgwick herself notes in passing. 199 In Sedgwick's terms, the closet
leaves "no space in the culture exempt" from its "potent incoherences of...
20 0
definition.
However, Sedgwick explicitly invites a more general exploration of the
purchase potentially opened up by her analysis of the "relations of the closet,"
which "have the potential for being peculiarly revealing.., about speech acts
more generally., 20 1
Sedgwick extends an invitation to deploy her
epistemological insight beyond the "modern homo/heterosexual definitional
crisis." Her purpose, she writes, is "not to know how far [the book's] ...
insights and projects are generalizable, not... to say in advance where the
semantic specificity of these issues gives over to (or: itself structures?) the
syntax of a 'broader' or more abstractable critical project., 20 2 Her analytical
method, she writes, has the ability "in the hands of an inquirer with different
needs, talents, or positionings, to clarify the distinctive kinds of resistance
offered to it from different spaces on the social map. .... ,203
Sedgwick's deconstructive reading of texts peculiarly symptomatic ofthe
late nineteenth-century's "radical condensation of sexual categories" in order to
explore its "unpredictably varied and acute implications and consequences"
notes that this binary split "took place in a setting... of urgent homophobic
pressure to devalue one of the two nominally symmetrical forms .... ,,204 So
too, the institutionalization of the binary published/unpublished took place in a
period when reaction against the direction constituted by Brown arguably
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at2.
Pether, InequitableInjunctions,supra note 4, at 1441 n.20.
SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 32.
ld. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 9.
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exerted a similar pressure on resistant legal institutions and actors to devalue
the United States's paradigmatic racial minority. 05
Sedgwick takes pains to argue that while the binary
homosexual/heterosexual is apparently symmetrically binary, 206 the two terms:
actually subsist in a more unsettled and dynamic tacit relation according to
which, first, term B is not symmetrical with but subordinated to term A;
but, second, the ontologically valorized term A actually depends for its
meaning on the simultaneous subsumption and exclusion of term B; hence,
third, the question of priority between the supposed central and the
supposed marginal category of each dyad is irresolvably unstable, an
instability caused by the fact that term B is constituted as at once internal
and external to term A.2°7
She goes on to caution that awareness of this "irresolvable instability" does not
mean that the binary is powerless, nor that its deconstruction neutralizes its
power. Rather, she suggests that the binary may be identified as "peculiarly
densely charged with lasting potentials for powerful manipulation...
precisely... [through] the double bind" and that recognizing this "irresolvable
instability" makes available "discursive authority" to persons with radically
different political investments. 0 8
Below are two texts--quotations-to read against each other and some
other (con)texts against which to read them, for the purposes of destabilizing,
however fleetingly, the epistemology of the binary opposition of precedent/not
precedent, the epistemology of "unpublication," and in the interests
anatomizing judicial culture which has made this cease to be a common law
country. The quotations are both from Judge Alex Kozinski of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the author of Hart, and a key
player-arguably the key player"° -in organizing opposition to recent modest

205. "I practiced race discrimination law for many years and found that many district court
opinions were available only from the Race Relations Law Reports and did not appear in the F.
Supp. It seemed likely that southern district judges were reluctant to send those opinions to
West. Had RRLR not aggressively sought to discover all race-related opinions we would have
been denied access to important information." E-Mail from Brian K. Landsberg, Professor of
Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to Penelope Pether, Professor of Law,
American University, Washington College of Law (Sept. 17,2004, 16:36:52 EST) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
206. SEDGwiCK, supra note 2, at 9.
207. Id. at 10.
208. Id.
209. See infranote 210 (describing Judge Kozinski's efforts to prevent a proposed rule that
would bar federal courts from forbidding citations to any of their opinions, orders, judgments, or
other written dispositions).
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reform measures 21° proceeding from the Federal Judicial Conference and earlier
from the federal legislature, directed at institutionalized unpublication.
First, in Hart, emphasizing the labor required in drafting precedential
opinions, which he characterized as "a solemn judicial act, ' 211 Judge Kozinski
opined that only a certain number of highly polished, and thus in his view,
publishable, opinions--on average twenty per judge 212 -could be produced
each year.213 As to unpublished opinions, he described these as "more or
less,2 14 a letter from the court to parties familiar with the facts, announcing the
result and the essential rationale of the court's decision. 2 15 He invoked the
210. These proposed reforms would see the adopting of proposed Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1, which would prevent Federal Courts from banning citation ofany of
their "judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions." On May 22, 2003, the
Advisory on Appellate Rules, an advisory committee of the Federal Judicial Conference,
reported the proposed rule to the Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, which then sought public comment and conducted hearings on the proposed rule.
Judge Kozinski apparently instigated a campaign of letter writing designed to generate and
document opposition to the Rule, and intervened with the Solicitor General to prevent Justice
Department support for the rule change. Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee voted on Apr.
14, 2004, to recommend the Rule change to the Full Rules Committee of the Conference. See
Pether, InequitableInjunctions,supra note 4, at 1470-71 nn. 170, 174 (2004) (recounting the
events that preceded the rule's passage). On June 16, 2004, the Standing Committee returned
the rule to the Advisory Committee, directing it to generate empirical data to determine whether
the arguments of the proponents or opponents of the rule change were better supported. See
generally Brent Kendall, Citation-Rule Change Hits Obstacle, DAILY J., June 18, 2004, at
http://www.nonpublication.con/kendall.htm. On June 17, 2005, at 2:03 p.m., the author
received a voicemail message from Tim Reagan, Senior Research Associate of the Federal
Judicial Center, informing her that the Standing Committee had voted to approve the Appellate
Advisory Committee's Proposed Rule Change permitting citation of unpublished opinions. The
full Judicial Conference voted in favor of the rule change on September 20, 2005. The
proposed Rule change now must be voted on by the United States Supreme Court, and
Congress. Patrick Schiltz, the Reporter for the Advisory Committee, had said of an earlier
version of the proposed rule change that it "will be very controversial," and Judge Alito, the
Chair of the Advisory Committee, also referring to the original Justice Department proposal for
the rule change, indicated that the chiefjudges of the circuits were divided on it and that several
circuits were concerned about it. See Pether, InequitableInjunctions, supranote 4, at 1470-71
n. 170 (noting comments of several members of the committee that considered the proposed rule
change). The Judicial Conference vote seems to have been the fruit, in part, of Judge Alito's
support and of the research done by the Federal Judicial Center at the Advisory Committee's
request.
211. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001).
212. But see supra note 195 (giving examples of Judge Kozinski's extracurricular writing
from the early 1990s: reviews of video games for The Wall Street Journal).
213. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1176-77.
214. Browsing those opinions currently enjoying their thirty days of crepuscular
illumination on the Ninth Circuit's website suggests that "less" is often the appropriate qualifier.
215. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1178. See also Joseph Pugliese, SubcutaneousLaw: Embodying
the ImmigrationAmendment Act of1992, 21 AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST L.J. 23, 25 (2004) (noting
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epistemology of unpublication in the (unusually valorized) implicit binary of
private correspondence and public record, thus manifesting the binary's "lasting
potentials for powerful manipulation" and demonstrating that this "irresolvable
instability" makes available "discursive authority., 2' 6 The official story he gave
was as follows:
That a case is decided without a precedential opinion does not mean it is
not fully considered, or that the disposition does not reflect a reasoned
analysis of the issues presented. What it does mean is that the disposition is
not written in a way that will be fully intelligible to those unfamiliar with
the case, and the rule of law is not
announced in a way that makes it
2 17
suitable for governing future cases.
Going on to decry the judicial time that would be wasted if parties were
allowed to cite to unpublished opinions, Judge Kozinski was at pains to claim
that writing is done by judges.218 As noted, Judge Kozinski's discourse on the
necessity of the binary publication/unpublication system to enable judges to
produce polished or carefully crafted "controlling... authority" 219 may proceed
from what in another context has been called his "hostility to dissent. 220 This
hostility seems to drive him to make the law speak with one tightly-controlled
voice, engaged in what some might call the Quixotic attempt to foreclose
interpretability via the "rigid constraint that binding authority provides
today. 2 21 There is more to be said about the discourse of control than this,
however.
In a conversation, in 2004, with a journalist, in one of the instances where
the judge appears both much less guarded about what he goes on the record as
saying and remarkably willing to say things that seem at profound odds with
what he says elsewhere, he conceded that:
Unpublished dispositions-unlike opinions-are often drafted entirely by
law clerks and staff attorneys.... There is simply no time or opportunity to
fine-tune the language of the disposition.... When the people making the
sausage tell you it's not safe for human consumption, it seems strange

that "' [a] letter,' writes Derrida, 'is always and a priori intercepted, ... the "subjects" are neither

the senders nor the receivers of messages.... The letter is constituted by its interception"). Or
by its dissentient, or disrespectful, translation and interpretation.
216.

SEDGwicK, supra note 2, at 10.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2001).
Idat 1178.
Id.
at 1172.
Devine &Aplin, supra note 27, at 27.
Hart,266 F.3d at 1174.
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indeed to22have a committee in Washington tell people to go ahead and eat it
anyway. 2

Added to that second quotation are the insights enabled by the following three
(con)texts.
First, Judge Kozinski and his colleague Judge Reinhardt have described
the Ninth Circuit's practices of preparing unpublished opinions, "which
(according to the judges] are churned out at a rate of more than one per day per
panel," as follows:
Most are drafted by law clerks with relatively few edits from the judges.
Fully 40 percent of our [unpublished opinions] are in screening cases,
which are prepared by our central staff. Every month, three judges meet
with the staff attorneys who present us with the briefs, records, and
proposed [unpublished opinions] in 100 to 150 screening cases. If we
unanimously agree that the case can be resolved without oral argument, we
make sure the result is correct, but we seldom edit the [unpublished
opinion], much less rewrite it from scratch.223
Next, in 2002, the then-Chair of the Federal Rules of Evidence Committee
opined in the Federal Rules Decisions:
No one can deny, however, that speeding up the production line while
cutting back on quality control will increase the risk of mistakes in any
operation. It is apparent (although almost never articulated) that some of
the circuits attitudes toward their non-reporter published opinions is driven
less by the belief that those opinions say nothing new than by the fear that
they may say something that is wrong.
He also noted that decisions about publication may be made not only by
individual judges or by committees of judges, but also by clerks or indeed by
West publishing.22 5 In New York and Colorado, the decision is effectively
made by a bureaucrat in the employ of the courts.
222.
223.

Tony Mauro, Difference of Opinion, LEGAL TIMEs, Apr. 12, 2004, at 10.
William T. Hangley, Opinions Hidden, Citations Forbidden: Report and

Recommendations of the American College of Trial Lawyers on the Publicationand Citationof
Nonbinding FederalCircuit Court Opinions, 208 F.R.D. 645, 651 (2002).

'224.

Hangley, supra note 223, at 651 (emphasis in original).

225. Hangley notes that "[c]onversations with a number of district court judges disclose
that their 'window picking' procedures are anything but uniform. Some judges select the
opinions they consider most significant for reporter publication, some leave that task to the
clerks, and others leave the entire selection process to West Publishing." Pether, Inequitable
Injunctions, supra note 4, at 1473 (citing Hangley, supra note 223, at 660 n.45). "These
practices can make a difference: where single judges can decide whether to publish, fewer
decisions are consigned to unpublication; Where a majority of judges must decide this,
unpublication levels are the highest. Another difference in the practices courts adopt for
handling unpublished opinions is that some courts have a published procedure that allows for
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Finally, analysis of one of a series of studies made in the 1980s of casemanagement procedures in the federal courts produced by the Federal Judicial
Center, the research arm of the federal courts, establishes that:
In many circuits the associated practices of [unpublication and] 'screening
cases for the nonargument track'
together with the delegation of much
judicial work either to clerks or staff attorneys who are often junior,
inexperienced, minimally trained,226 and dissatisfied with the tasks assigned
them, mean that judges often do not read any part of the record of an appeal
before 'signing off on an unpublished opinion written by a [clerk or more
often a] staff attorney.227
Judge Kozinski is in some respects a "straw judge" around whom to
construct the argument made here, that we have ceased to be a common law
country because we have ceased to produce common law judges, but he is,
regrettably, not alone. Below are listed just a few examples of evidence of the
increasing pervasiveness of the epistemology of unpublication. In 2003, a
former student attempted to secure from an Alaskan court two unpublished
228
opinions allowing same-sex couple adoption on a "second parent" basis.
There were no published opinions allowing this practice, and unpublished
opinions do not have precedential status in Alaska. 229 He was informed that he
had to make a written submission to the court seeking "release" of the two
opinions in question, and the court clerk, apparently passing on a message from
a judge, expected him to believe that this procedure was required because "the
cases are closed by statute because they involve minors., 230 This was despite
the fact that the most cursory research would establish that there are volumes of
published Alaskan adoption cases, almost all of which, by definition, involve
minors. Next, the Ninth Circuit's response to the legislative amendment

parties to petition the court to publish an unpublished opinion. There is evidence that still other
courts allow this in the absence of a publicly promulgated rule. Once again, this enables the
selective manipulation of precedent by well-informed litigants." Pether, Inequitable
Injunctions,supra note 4, at 1473-74 (internal citations omitted).
226. The clerk is also likely thoroughly infected with a judicial culture that is angered by
and despises the litigants and matters characteristically tracked in this way, and is beholden to
the judges who hire her for recommendation for future employment.
227.

Pether, InequitableInjunctions, supra note 4, at 1492 n.314.

228. See id. at 1486 n.287 (detailing student's search).
229. Id.at 1486, 1537.
230. Id.
at 1486 n.287. There is a very useful, if vulgar, Australian expression which aptly
describes what happened to Mr. Morris here: He was "treated like a mushroom," that is, "fed on
bullshit and kept in the dark." He was also expected to expend a lot of (likely fruitless) energy
on his inconvenient request for the opinions in the face of an evident falsehood, proceeding
from a court, about why they were not available to a member of the public.
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requiring posting on websites in "text searchable form'
was to issue a policy
noting that "[e]ffective September 28, 2004, the court's memoranda opinions
will be posted on our.., web page.... [and] will be removed after 30 days.
Memoranda dispositions issues by the court's screening panels [that is, likely
the vast majority of them] are not currently included. 2 32 The Ninth Circuit's
memorandum opinions available on the website are only searchable by matter
number, party name, or date; that is, you have to know exactly what you are
looking for to search them.233
Additionally, there is the phenomenon ofwhat, and this may sound rather
old-fashioned, should be documents of public record made preferentially
available to West and LEXIS, who are also empowered to alter the texts of
those documents and otherwise shape the searchable universe of the common
law, 3 while at the same time deriving duopolistic profits from their privileged
access.235 This has a significant inequality effect given that most law graduates
practice in small firms with limited financial capacity to subscribe to the Rolls
Royce system of "publication '236 that West and LEXIS control,237 and given the
inability of what is posted on some court websites, where those documents are
posted, to be meaningfully searched.238 There is, in addition, ample evidence
that modem institutionalized unpublication, congruent with and bearing the

231. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347 (codified at 44 U.S.C § 3501 Sec.
205(a)(5)) (requiring, apparently, that federal court opinions be published on court websites in
"text searchable format").
232. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit webpage, at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/, (last visited Oct. 22, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review.) The deletion policy does not seem to have been assiduously followed, as at least
some opinions more that 30 days old are on the website.
233. As is the case with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.
234. See Pether, Inequitable Injunctions,supranote 4, at 1466-68 & n. 145 (detailing legal
publishers' power to regulate access to and the content of unpublished opinions).
235. See id.at 1468 (discussing the hegemony of LEXIS and Westlaw in the legal
publishing industry).
236. The system includes both published and unpublished opinions.
237. See Pether,InequitableInjunctions,supranote 4, at 1515-17 (discussing the unequal
access to unpublished opinions exacerbated by courts' preferential treatment of LEXIS and
Westlaw and the advantages their expensive services provide to frequent and often privileged
litigants). See generally J.P. MORGAN SECuRITIES LTD, EQUITIES RESEARCH, U.S. LEGAL
PUBLISHING INDUSTRY: A GROWTH STORY? 3, 5 (2002). Ian Gallacher, Finding the Law:
Introducing the Legal Research Curriculum at the Washington College of Law (unpublished
manuscript, copy on file with the author).
238. See supranote 233 and accompanying text (explaining that memoranda opinions on
the websites of the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits are only searchable by party name, date, or
matter number).
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239
traces of the secret history of race discrimination that impelled it in private,
operates to produce inequality effects. That is, it operates in discriminatory
ways to structurally subordinate certain groups, including: social security
appellants, gay men and lesbians, ADA appellants and appellants against
NLRB decisions, and indeed appellants against the government generally, pro
se appellants and those with poor-quality and poorly-resourced lawyers, and
likely also claimants under VAWA, (ironically) under the Prisoner Litigation
Reform Act, Civil Rights litigants more generally, prison inmates claiming
sexual abuse by prison officers, and criminal law appellants in non- or prehabeas cases, at least in the Fourth Circuit.24 In addition, there are various
costs to the rule of law (or at least to rule of law talk and its material effects).
Its aspects include: transparency and due process effects, the compromising of
judicial accountability and legitimacy, the stunting of the potential development
of the common law, the congeries of theoretical and practical problems in
declaring opinions prospectively unprecedential, and what is at least the
appearance of the possibility of corruption. 241 There is widespread evidence
that institutionalized unpublication allows repeat players to selectively
manipulate precedent by rigging the system to try to keep precedents that
operate to their disadvantage unpublished and thus nonprecedential.2 42 Further,
these opinions are often effectively inaccessible to anyone except repeat players
libraries of unpublished opinions
who have the resources to keep well-indexed
243
course.
of
matter
a
as
so
and do
Finally, judges themselves (and attorneys and former judicial clerks) have
gone on record noting that what we might call corruption or cynicism combined
with disingenuousness operate in the selection of opinions for unpublication,
and freely admitting that they often do not follow their own published rules for
sorting the publishable from the unpublishable. They also delegate the work of
Article 111 judges to clerks and staff attorneys, most of whom are barely out of

239. See Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supranote 4, at 1440-41 n.20 (introducing the
argument that "the paradigm of private judging replaced legalized racial discrimination as a
structural means for U.S. common law; to exclude 'others' from its protection").
240. See id. at 1505-07 nn.402-04 (citing evidence that unpublished opinions form part of
a system structured to discriminate against "disadvantaged groups").
241. See id. at 1483-88 (discussing unpublished opinions' negative effects on the rule of
law).
242. See id. at 1511 (arguing that "[j]ust as the poor and other comparatively powerless
litigants are disadvantaged by unpublication, depublication, and stipulated withdrawal of
judicial opinions, so repeat players and the privileged... are advantaged by... private
judging").
243. Id.
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law school and who, the evidence suggests, are simply not up to the task, 244
both because of their impoverished research and reasoning skills 245 and also
because of the culture in which they often operate.24 6 Judge Kozinski, for
example, one of the most influential feeder judges for Supreme Court
clerkships, 247 has gone on record as saying that a key criterion in his selection
of clerks is his intolerance for "dissent in chambers., 248 Additionally, there is
evidence of party-line and other kinds of judicial bias associated with
institutionalized unpublication, most recently evinced by a study of the Ninth
Circuit's immigration jurisprudence.24 9
Most recently, in the June 1, 2005 Report on Citations to Unpublished
Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals of the Federal Judicial Center, there
was significant evidence ofjudicial officers in many circuits opposing the rule
change who claimed "special problems" were likely to arise for their circuit if
the proposed rule change was implemented when what they actually feared was
a projected result of general application such as workload increase. 250 That
they were unable or unwilling to take care in advancing this argument is
indicative of the spread of the "epistemology of unpublication" with its
attendant contempt, dishonesty, and corrosiveness. 251 There is much more
obviously troubling and widespread evidence of cynicism and poor standards in
predictions ofjudicial opponents to the proposed change opining that it would
244. See generally Penelope Pether, Negotiatingthe Structures of Violence; or, On Not
Inventing "The Sullivans," 15 Soc. SEMIoTICs 5, 23-26 (2005); Penelope Pether, Praxis;or the
Benefits of Shedding Hostilityto Theory, "The LanguageofLaw," Forum, 2 LAw, CULTURE AND
THE HuMANITIEs (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Pether, Praxis] (presenting conflicting quotes
on the quality of unpublished opinions and evidence of the deficient research skills ofjudicial
clerks) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
245. See Pether, Praxis,supranote 244 (discussing evidence of clerks and staff attorneys'
inadequate research and reasoning skills).
246. See Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 4, at 1462 n.132 (describing the
culture in which appellate court clerks operate) (citing JOE S. CECIL & DONNA STIENSTRA,
DECIDING CASES WIrHOUT ARGUMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURTS OF APPEALS, 1987
WL 123661 (F.J.C. 1985)).
247. Edward S. Adam, A Market-based Solution to the Judicial Clerkship Selection
Process,59 MD. L. REV. 129, 137 n.57 (2000) (citing Tony Mauro, Corps of Clerks Lacking in
Diversity, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1998, at A12).
248. Alex Kozinski & Fred Bernstein, ClerkshipPolitics,2 GREEN BAG 57-59,62-63, 2d
Series, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1998), availableat http://www.greenbag.org/KozinskiDialogue.
pdf.
249. See generally Law, supra note 156.
250. REAGAN ET AL., supra note 5, at Appendix A.
251. This is of a piece with the recently revealed practice of the district court for the
Southern District of Florida running a "secret docket" to hide cases from public scrutiny.
United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1024 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
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lead to judges, for example, cutting the text of unpublished opinions to a bare
minimum, without reasoning; 25 2 and in judges decrying the necessity to
carefully check (or indeed meaningfully check at all) the work of clerks and
staff attorneys in screened cases.253 Additionally, ajudge on the Ninth Circuit
opposing the rule change cited the high volume of immigration cases in that
circuit as a reason why the proposed rule change would cause special problems
there. 254 This concern suggests that the origins of modem institutionalized
unpublication, in judicial race bias in the aftermath of Brown, 255 may support
this other "peculiar institution" as well.
The inconsistent stories that emerge in Judge Kozinski's articulation of the
epistemology of unpublication suggest the force of Sedgwick's insight into "the
contemptuous demonstration that powerful people don't have to be acute or
right, but even more, the contemptuous demonstration... of how obtuseness
0,56
on the one hand,and what
itself arms the powerful against their enemies...
on
the
other. Judge Kozinski's
a respectful dissenter might call "inconsistency"
writings on modem institutionalized unpublication manifest a tolerance for
what some might call intellectual sloppiness and others disingenuousness.
They also exhibit an acceptance of unaccountability to the public and the law
and for the work of minimally supervised underlings.
The recent Report of the Federal Judicial Center indicates that while Judge
Kozinski may be extreme, he is far from alone. We have ceased to be a
common law country for two reasons. First, our methodologically bankrupt
system cannot meaningfully differentiate between generating binding and
persuasive precedent in any way that does not depend on raw and essentially
252. See, e.g., REAGAN ET AL., supranote 5, Judge 7-2 at 85 (stating that the judge would
write shorter orders stating, for example, that the "evidence is sufficient" with no further
explanation); id. Judge 7-1 at 85 (explaining that the judge would be more likely to write
"cursory, one-line orders").
253. See, e.g., id.Judge 7-1 at 84-85 (opposing increased judicial time supervising staff
attorneys and mandating that all opinions be "polished, thoughtfully considered" opinions); id.
Judge 9-11 at 88 (supporting the current practice of judges reviewing unpublished opinions
"minimally, mostly for result"); id. Judge 9-21 at 89 (evincing a lack of confidence in opinions
written by staff attorneys and the hope that they would never be persuasive authority).
254. See, e.g., id. Judge 9-2 at 86-87 (citing problems involved in checking earlier rulings
in immigration cases more carefully to avoid intracircuit splits in repetitive situations).
255. See Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 4, at 1440-41 (introducing the
argument that institutionalized unpublication replaced legalized racial discrimination as the
primary means in United States "common law" of excluding others).
256. SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 7 (commenting on the claim in the majority opinion in
Bowers v. Hardwick that "to claim that a right to engage in sodomy is 'deeply rooted in this
nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best,
facetious").
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legislative power. Thus, we have moved to a version of precedent that seeks to
bind the future rather than to be informed by the past, the practical justifications
of which are at best intellectually impoverished and Janus-faced, and reveal the
price to the ethical fiber of the judiciary that this exacts. Second, as long as
modem institutionalized unpublication persists, we will not normalize common
law judges ethically negotiating the boundaries between past and future,
between the nation's law and the law of the land and its people, a demanding
and, now perhaps more than ever, critical ethical task.
In closing, it beggars my comprehension, conservatively trained common
lawyer that I am, how a judiciary which regards its responsibilities with the
gravity they merit could, in the face of this evidence, not be moved to respond
to it with alacrity and alarm, but rather engage in the kind of displacement
activity that has surrounded FRAP 32.1 for the past two years. The rule of law
can be nothing more than a species of last refuge of the scoundrel, or an
instrument of colonialism. Or it can, as Lord Cooke and Judge Tatel have
suggested, be what is not melodramatic to call the solemn trust of judicial
officers in constitutional democracies, where majoritarian tyranny and the risks
to individual and civil rights of unchecked executive power are constitutionally
possible.
Madison famously wrote that "a people who mean to be their own
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." 257 I
believe, perhaps betraying my training and enormous respect for the best of
common law judges, that there remains some chance that the United States
judiciary will hear the appeal to their office that lawyers and scholars and some
of their brethren are making, and respond with seriousness to evidence of the
undermining of trust in and respect for our courts and the judicial office that the
persistence of the system of institutionalized unpublication causes. This is
despite my registering the force of Sedgwick's acute insight that the
"irresolvable instability '258 of the system of published/unpublished opinions,
precedential/nonprecedential decisions, law/not law signals not that it is easy to
supplant but rather a site "peculiarlydensely charged with lasting potentials for
powerful manipulation."' 259 Until those powerful judicial subjects undertake a
257.

In re Lindsay, 158 F.3d 1263, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing letter from James

Madison to W.T. Berry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRINGS

OF JAMES MADISON

103 (Gaillard

Hunted., 1910)).
258. See SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 10 (arguing that the system of binary oppositions
constitutive of Western epistemology is not symmetrical but rather "unsettled and dynamic" and
thus "irresolvably unstable").
259. Id.at 10 (emphasis in the original). We must also remember Robert Gordon's insight
that "[a] substantial chunk of our legal history is a truly horrifying epic of justice denied and
persecution of those who struggle for it. Legal elites, who in the most complacent liberal and
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new ethically charged approach to their responsibility to others for the law of
the land, those others among us with responsibility for the development of the
common law must imagine ways to respond to Madison's counsel.

conservative stories are the statesmen-like vanguard of progressive politics, ceaselessly adapting
law to the waking needs of society." Robert W. Gordon, The PoliticsofLegal Historyand the
Searchfor a Usable Past,4 BENCHMARK 269, 277 (1990).

